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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYN L. MATTINGLY and the 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Utah State Department of 
Social Services, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
THOMAS C. MATTINGLY, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 14627 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The issues are procedural question^. Specifically, the 
basic issue is whether or not it is appropriate to take depo-
sitions in actions to recover child support arrearages without 
first obtaining an order to show cause. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lowei court, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding, 
entered an order on the 4th day of June, 1976, decreeing: 
1. That the State of Utah's intervention in the above 
entitled matter is proper based on the fact that the expendi-
ture of welfare funds makes the State of Utah a proper party to 
the action. 
2. That the signing of a divorce decree makes the action 
final,and the intervention of the State of Utah does not give 
rise to a cause of action upon which a deposition may be taken. 
3. That the State of Utah cannot take a deposition re-
garding child support payment after the signing of a divorce 
decree without an order to show cause pending in the 
matter. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have provisions #2 and #3 of Judge 
Bryant Croft's order of June 4, 197 6, reversed and an order 
entered requiring the defendant to appear, pursuant to the 
subpoena, that issued for the purpose of taking his deposition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Mattingly was formerly married to the plaintiff. 
Children resulted from this union, prior to their divorce. 
A child support order was entered pursuant to the divorce 
decree, but the defendant fell in arrearage on his payments. 
Subsequently, the plaintiff was required to go on state wel-
fare to support her children. The State of Utah brought an 
action, pursuant to statute, to be joined as a party and to 
take defendant's deposition to ascertain what the circumstances 
were concerning the support arrearages. 
On May 25, 197G, counsel for plaintiffs and defendant 
appeared before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge in the 
Third Judicial District for Salt Lake County. Defendant's 
counsel was in court objecting to the state's interpleader 
action and notice of taking deposition. The judge found that 
the State of Utah was a proper party. However, the judge 
found that once a final divorce decree is signed, the case 
is closed; and, therefore, no action concerning the taking 
of depositions could occur until there was an order to show 
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cause. From this decision, the plaintiffs-appellants 
appeal, 
POINT I 
THE SIGNING OF A DIVORCE DECREE IN UTAH IS FINAL ONLY 
INSOFAR AS THE RIGHTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, BUT THE DECREE I 
NEVER FINAL AS TO THE SUPPORT RIGHTS OF THE CHILDREN. 
While a divorce decree is final as to the litigants, i 
is well established law in Utah that divorce decrees are 
never final in respect to child support rights. This prin-
ciple has been codified in state law, ahd this high court 
has consistently held the same: 
Sec. 30-3-5, U.C.A. (1953) 
Disposition of property and children— 
When a decree of divorce is made, %he court 
may make such orders in relation tct> the 
children, property and parties, anq. the 
maintenance of the parties and children, as 
may be equitable. The court shall have con-
tinuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent 
charges or new orders with respect to the 
support and maintenance of the parties, the 
custody of the children and their support and 
maintenance, or the distribution of the prop-
erty as shall be reasonable and necessary. 
/Emphasis added_/7 
/I,27 From the language of the statute, 
and as stated numerous times by the decisions 
of this court, these propositions $re firmly 
established: (1) that such proceedings are 
equitable;1 and (2) that under the authority 
conferred "to make subsequent changes or new 
orders with respect to * * * the custody of the 
children and their support and maintenance * * *" 
the court retains jurisdiction to deal with such 
matters in supplemental proceeding^ with the samp 
authority and in the same manner afe it could 
deal with them originally.^ /Emphasis added^7 
Harmon v. Harmon, 491 P.2d 231, 232, 26 U. 2d 436. 
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From this language, it is clear that a court in Utah 
has full authority to deal with continuing child support 
matters in the same manner as it could deal with them origin-
ally, even after the divorce decree is final. This is because 
the divorce decree is really a separate entity, altogether 
different from the issue of child support, and the two are 
related tangentially at best. Thus, while the divorce de-
cree is a final judgment between the litigants, i.e., the 
parents, the issue of child support is a separate and dis-
tinct issue between the minor children and their father. It 
is, therefore, incongruous for a trial court to assume that 
the final divorce decree has any finality as to its effect 
on the child support issue. As quoted from Harmon, supra: 
"The court retains jurisdiction to deal with such matters 
/child support and maintenance/ in supplemental proceedings 
with the same authority and in the same manner as it could 
deal with them originally." 
Other Utah cases supporting this basic position include: 
Rees v. Archibald, 6 Utah 2d 864, 311 P.2d 788; Bott v. Bott, 
20 U.2d 329, 437 P.?d 684; Harrison v. Harrison, 22 U.2d 180, 
450 P.2d 456; Ridinn v. Riding, 329 P.2d 878, 8 Utah 2d 136. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUANCE OF A SUBPOENA TO COMPEL ATTENDANCE FOR 
DEPOSITION PROCEEDINGS, WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING AN ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE, IS APPROPRIATE IN DIVORCE CASES WHERE ARREARAGES 
IN SUPPORT PAYMENTS EXIST. 
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Authorized by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-(1-9), 
the State of Utah has the authority to collect support funds 
in the manner of reimbursement for public funds expended in 
the support of children and neglected families. The receiv-
ing of public assistance aid establishes the need of the 
welfare recipient as well as bringing into play the authori-
tative, collateral position of the Stat^ of Utah in collecting 
child support payments. 
As was established in point #1, supra, the cases are 
numerous holding that divorce decrees are never final insofar 
as child custody and support matters, fiy definition, they are 
modifiable and if they are modifiable it is proper to allow 
the free use of depositions to help establish financial status* 
The requirement of first obtaining an order to show cause 
prior to talcing such depositions is an unwarranted burden, 
Utah Coclo Annotated, 30-3-1, states as follows: 
Proceedings in divorce shall be commenced 
and conducted in the manner provided by law for 
proceedings in civil causes. 
Since divorce proceedings and continuing support require-
ments are civil in nature, it only follows that Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rules 26-37, regarding depositions and dis-
covery, may properly be used in arrearage matters following a 
divorce decree. Until the point of time when final judgment 
is entered, discovery by deposition under Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rules 26-30, is available to help establish what 
has or what has not been paid. And since divorce decrees 
are never final as to child support, the free use of 
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depositions to determine a father's financial status, even 
after the divorce decree, is entirely proper. Thus, the 
Rules of Civil Procedure apply to child support as being a 
continuing aspect of the original divorce proceedings. 
Many states recognize that pretrial disclosure might 
destroy any chance of reconciliation of the parties, but once 
the decree has been signed, this concern goes to the welfare 
of the children and not to hopes of reconciliation. This 
court cogently explained this basic principle and its rela-
tionship to divorce decrees, continuing child support, et 
al., in Harmon v. Harmon, supra. 
In order to carry out the important responsi-
bility of safeguarding the interests and welfare 
of children, it has always been deemed that the 
courts have broad equitable powers. To accept the 
plaintiff's contention that an adjudged arrearage 
is tantamount to a judgment in law, would in the 
long run tend to impair rather than to enhance the 
abilities of both the plaintiff and the court to 
accomplish the desired objective. Such a judgment 
at law does not have the valuable and useful attri-
bute which allows its enforcement by contempt mea-
sures. For the foregoing reasons decrees and orders 
in divorce proceedings are of a different and higher 
character than judgments in suits at law; and by their 
nature are better suited to the purpose of protecting 
the interests and welfare of children.^5 
In carrying out that objective there are a 
number of factors to be taken into consideration. 
These include not only the enforcement of the pay-
ment of support money which becomes due, but per-
haps more important, the conserving of the prospects 
for its continuance^ At p. 23 2, 233. /Emphasis 
addedTT 
This language indicates the rather unique character of 
divorce decrees and child support. It further points out the 
fallacious reasoning of the district court in assuming that a 
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final divorce decree has the same effect as other final 
judgments, insofar as discovery is concerned. 
There is nothing in the common law or the laws of the 
State of Utah that indicates that the free use of depositions 
in matters of arrearages is not a legitimate modern discovery 
tool. Rule 30(a) states as follows: 
When Depositions May Be Taken. After 
commencement of the action, any party may 
take the testimony of any person, including 
a party, by deposition upon oral examination. 
/Emphasis added_/7 
This rule makes no mention of, nor limits the situation or 
type of case in which the deposition may be taken. In parti-
cular, it has no requirement of obtaining an order to show 
cause before a deposition can be taken. 
Furthermore, U.C.A., Section 30-3-5, supra, makes clear 
that matters of arrearage in child support are actually part 
of the original divorce action; and, thus, despite the final 
divorce decree, should still be subject to the same discovery 
procedures as any other matter in the original action. And, 
since an order to show cause is normall^ not required to take 
a deposition in civil cases, there is no justifiable reason 
to require such an order in arrearage matters. 
Corpus Juris Secundum states the following concerning 
the scope of examination for which deposlitions can be used in 
divorce actions: 
Scope of examination. In the taking of 
a deposition all matters may be inquired into 
which may be presented as evidence at the trial; 
considerable liberality should be allowed in the 
cross-examination of a witness . . . 27 C.J.S., 
Divorce, Section 145. 
This gives broad license for,the use of depositions, 
going so far as saying "all matters." Surely, "all matters" 
can reasonably be construed to include arrearages. And, in 
particular, such depositions should be allowed without the 
added burden of first obtaining an order to show cause. 
Even in older cases, where discovery techniques were 
limited, the courts allowed the use of depositions for de-
termining the financial status of the husband after a decree 
of divorce had been entered. In Scheffer v. Scheffer, 48 
N.Y.S.2d 839, 183 Misc. 344, a wife was bringing a contempt 
action against her former husband for failure to pay alimony. 
The wife was seeking to take her former husband's deposition, 
to determine his financial status in an attempt to collect 
arrearages. The court said: 
. . . Examinations before trial as to 
a husband's financial ability have been denied 
in matrimonial actions upon the theory that in 
advance of the establishment of the right to a 
separation or a divorce, the plaintiff should 
not be permitted to examine the defendant as to 
his financial affairs. Here, however, the right 
to a divorce has been established by a final 
judgment of divorce, and it is necessary for the 
plaintiff to obtain information concerning the 
earnings and financial condition of the defend-
ant in order to properly present her case to the 
official referje. Otherwise, the reference 
might prove abortive, and of little value; at 
best, a wife generally has little knowledge of 
the financial condition of a husband from whom 
she has been separated or divorced." Page 840. 
/Emphasis added^7 
Thus, as this New York court held, there must be some 
tool available to parties to establish what the situation is 
relative to child support payments. It seems incongruous to 
say that once the decree is signed, the parties cannot freely 
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use discovery to establish whether modifications should be 
made or to find out why child support payments are not cur-
rent. Such should be permitted to allo^ the fair and equit-
able procedures in such matters as divorce which in every way 
seem to require concern when the welfar^ of children are at 
stake and indeed provide an inexpensive method of insuring 
accuracy and compliance with such matters. The purpose of the 
recovery program of the State of Utah is to conserve tax dol-
lars. It seems antithetical to that purpose, as well as to 
general public policy, to require the state to seek an order 
to show cause before depositions can be taken in arrearage 
recovery cases. Such a requirement cannot be supported 
legally; and, in terms of time and public expense, it cannot 
be justified. 
CONCLUSION 
Because divorce decrees are never final, insofar as 
child support, is concerned, the court continues to retain 
the same jurisdiction on arrearage matters as it had in the 
original divorce proceedings. 
It follows, therefore, that the Ut^h Rules of Civil 
Procedure apply to arrearage matters following a divorce 
decree. Since it is the policy of the court to encourage 
free discovery, it is neither legally sound nor economically 
feasible, in terms of both time and money, to require a 
party to obtain an order to show cause before taking a depo-
sition in an arrearage matter. Legally, there should be 
no distinction between the use of depositions prior to or 
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subsequent to a divorce decree, at least insofar as child 
support matters are concerned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Utah Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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